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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
be expected that lay arbitrators would have trouble with this
term, and would fail to anticipate the difficulty of administering
such qualifications of it as "gross," "slight," and other terms
implying degree. Equally unfortunate is the temptation to
eliminate negligence as the basis for disciplinary action. In
-damaging or destroying material it requires little ingenuity to
cover up intention with the cloak of negligence. Accordingly,
arbitrators must, in the long run, accept the concept of negli-
gence as one of their working tools, but would do well to avoid
the pitfalls into which the case-law has fallen.
Finally, the arbitrators in this group of cases have shown
the same tendency, as in others, to admit rather freely evidence
which aggravates or mitigates the offense; and they have agreed
also what evidence has these effects. Accordingly, these cases,
.dealing as they do, with one of the most serious of industrial
problems, show the same tendency toward uniformity, resulting
largely from following legal analogies, that has been observed
in the arbitration of other disputes.
RICHARD C. ALLEN
DISHONESTY, DISLOYALTY AND THEFT
It might seem that an employee who has been guilty of theft
,or other dishonesty would in every case be subject to discharge.
Indeed, many labor-management contracts expressly make the
dishonesty of an employee a ground for summary discharge;
and, in any event, discharge or other discipline for theft or other
,dishonesty would fall squarely within the general requirement
that discipline and discharge are to be imposed only for "just
cause." Nevertheless, even a casual perusal of the reported arbi-
tration cases would reveal that most arbitrators are extremely
reluctant to discharge employees on these grounds. In the vast
majority of cases, the arbitrators search the record long and
,carefully for mitigating circumstances and generally impose
penalties much less severe than discharge.1
Few employers will hire a man whose record of previous
,employment shows that he has been discharged for theft or
1. A study of forty-two cases shows that in approximately 15 per cent
only was discharge permitted in cases of dishonest acts committed within
'the scope of employment. See infra, for a possible explanation of what
.seems a surprisingly low figure.
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other dishonesty. Hence, any apparent leniency of the arbitra-
tors may rest on their realization that virtual exclusion from
further gainful employment, and not merely the loss of the job
then in question, will result from their sustaining a discharge
on such grounds. 2 To avoid any such socially undesirable result,
arbitrators resort to various techniques. Sometimes, when other
bases for discharge appear in evidence, in addition to evidence
of theft or dishonesty, arbitrators sustain the discharge on the
grounds conveying the lesser social stigma; and this has been
done even when the company has not urged the ground on which
the discharge is ultimately based.3 Many arbitrators quite prop-
erly refuse to discharge an employee on the ground of theft or
dishonesty unless the company meets a very heavy burden of
proof.4 In general, arbitrators display an appreciation and un-
derstanding of the importance to the employee of his job rights,
and inquire into all the surrounding circumstances to insure
against inequality of treatment, other discrimination, and im-
proper employer motivation5
As a partial explanation for the large percentage of theft or
dishonesty cases in which penalties less extreme than discharge
are imposed, it has been suggested that only the questionable
ones reach the arbitration level. Since most unions dispose of
the clear cases of stealing and other dishonesty at the grievance
level, it must be noted that this high percentage of cases in
which the company is not sustained in discharging the offending
employee is misleading. Hence, it does not follow merely from
these arbitration cases that theft and dishonesty are lightly dealt
with in industry.
2. See Myron Gollub, Discharge for Cause (N. Y. Dept. of Labor 1948)
45, where the author indicates that in his opinion this has been the chief
influence in mitigating punishment in cases in the state of New York.
3. An intimation of this solution may be found in In re New England
Bakery and International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware-
housemen and Helpers of America, Bakery and Food Drivers, Local 64,
3 ALAA 68,202 (1948).
4. A case which clearly indicates the reluctance to discharge for dis-
honesty because of the social implications is In re Goodyear Decatur Mills
and United Textile Workers of America, Local 88 (AFL), 11 LA 303(1948). Other cases indicating that the social implications make neces-
sary a heavy burden of proof are In re Amelia Earhart Luggage Co. and
Luggage Workers Union, Local 62 (AFL), 3 ALAA 68,064 and In re
Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc. and Amalgamated Ass'n of Street,
Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees of America, 3 ALAA 68,130(1948).
5. The constant reiteration of these principles can be seen by reference
to any case cited herein.
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I. DISHONESTY WITHIN THE SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT
The first tendency to be observed in cases where the issue is a
dishonest act within the plant arises where there is a union-
management contract. Where it is specified that dishonesty will
in all cases give the employer grounds for discharge, the arbi-
trators have construed the word "dishonesty" narrowly. The
effect is to confine the cases in which this terminology can apply
to relatively few situations. Thus where, in the words of an
arbitrator, the report of a truck accident "was not a frank and
full disclosure of what had occurred" this was held insufficient
to warrant discharge where the employer could not show finan-
cial loss resulting therefrom. Similarly, where a contract per-
mitted immediate discharge for dishonesty, it was determined
that the term did not include taking an extended lunch hour and
using the company's time for the employee's own purposes.'
Another factor which mitigates against discharge where there
is a claim of dishonesty within the plant is previous knowledge
by the company of the practice involved, especially where other
employees who did the same thing have not been disciplined.
If the arbitrator finds a time interval between the time the
practice is made known to the company and the time of punish-
ment, this too will tend to diminish the degree of punishment.
A milk driver who pocketed charges to customers for goods not
delivered, and who falsified his records, was ordered reinstated,
the arbitrator stating that management had collaborated by
failing to take earlier action.8 Again, the discharge of bus oper-
ators accused of dishonesty in handling fares collected was held
to be without just cause where the loss of a few coins was recog-
nized as normal and the company had not posted these employ-
ees for discrepancies, as was the custom.9 Two assumptions
would seem to underlie this reason for mitigation: (1) that
6. In re Ruan Transportation Company and International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local 90, 2 ALAA
1 67, 879 (1947). The quoted arbitrator is Judson E. Piper.
7. In re Coca-Cola Bottling Company of New York, Inc. and Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers
of America, Soft Drink Workers Union, Local 812 (AFL), 7 LA 236(1947).
8. In re Borden's Farm Products and International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local 584(AFL), 2 LA 173 (date unknown).
9. In re Southern Indiana Gas & Electric Company and Amalgamated
Ass'n of Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees of America,
Div. 878 (AFL), 6 LA 89, 2 ALAA % 67,575 (1946).
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where the company is so lax, it must share the blame with the
employee, and (2) if other employees are similarly involved, the
company is guilty of discrimination against the individual
singled out to receive punishment. 0
Another factor which affects the degree of punishment to be
given is the employee's past record. "When one considers
Dzikowski's exemplary record as an employee,"' ' "Since the
company does not dispute the ten and a half year's service of
Licciardi' 1 2 are but two examples of the words used by arbitra-
tors which indicate their interest in the welfare of the employee
with a good service record extending over a long period of time.
In summary, the general problems raised by the intra-plant
and on-the-job acts of dishonesty have been handled in a manner
which bears an analogy to the doctrine of the balancing of
equities found in courts of chancery. The analogy cannot be
carried to extremes, for the social consequences of an outright
discharge are so apparent that there is a strong initial equity
in the employee's favor when management seeks to deprive him
of his job. The concept has influenced all arbitrators, but was
stated most frankly in this manner:
These facts support the general principle, applicable to in-
dividual contracts between employer and employee, which
is recognized both in law and equity, that such contracts
should be construed most strongly against the employer. 3
II. ACTS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT
Quite different problems are raised when disciplinary action is
taken against an employee who has been accused of dishonest
acts outside the plant. Here the mitigating factors so vital
where intra-plant acts are concerned are reduced in importance.
There are few cases from which to draw conclusions as to the
degree to which an employer can impose penalties in such a
10. The balancing of the equities by the arbitrator seems clearly evi-
denced.
11. In re Yonkers Bus, Inc. and Transport Workers Union of America
(CIO), 7 LA 144, 145 (1947). The quoted arbitrator is Sidney L. Cohn.
12. In re Boston Sausage and Provision Company and United Packing-
house Workers of America, Local 11 (CIO), 8 LA 483, 486 (1947). The
quoted arbitrator is A. Howard Myers.
13. In re Aviation Maintenance Corp. and International Ass'n of
Machinists, Aeronautical Industrial District Lodge 727, 8 LA 261, 268
(1947). The quoted arbitrator is Benjamin Aaron. He cited no authority
to sustain this sweeping generalization, and it is questionable that many
arbitrators would care to see the concept phrased in this manner.
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case, but it would certainly seem that the employer will at least
be given the opportunity to remove such an employee from a
position of trust. Where a militarized police guard was arrested
on suspicion of burglary, the arbitrator held that an immediate
discharge was justifiable; in an award published concurrently,
this same employee was denied a right to insist on reemploy-
ment when acquitted in a jury trial.14 While war-time condi-
tions may account for the first decision, the second would seem
to indicate that employers have considerable latitude in such
circumstances.
Another case involved a salesman suspended from work in
a department store when arrested on suspicion of receiving
stolen merchandise. When the grand jury decided not to indict
the employee, he petitioned to receive back pay. The arbitrator
found his suspension was for good and sufficient reason."
III. FALSIFICATION OF APPLICATION
Here the type of dishonesty involved is quite different from
outright theft. It is generally conceded that the desire to suc-
ceed in winning employment may tend to cause a "stretching"
of the truth. Many labor-management contracts contain a pro-
vision that falsification of application is sufficient reason for
discharge by the company. Arbitrators have chosen to construe
these provisions with considerable leniency toward the employee,
however, to prevent companies from using such clauses as a
means towards other ends. 8
When the company discharges a worker for alleged falsifica-
tion of an employment application, the arbitrator's first concern
is to see that the motive of the employer is as it appears on the
surface. In one case, where the company expended time and
effort in proving falsification of the job application, but the
arbitrator found that the true motive of the discharge was to
promote another who was junior in service, the fact that the
14. In re Swift & Company and United Packinghouse Workers of Amer-
ica, Local 47 (CIO), 5 LA 703 (1946).
15. In re Wilson and Rogers and Retail Wholesale and Department
Store Union, Retail, Wholesale and Chain Store Food Employees Union,
Local 338 (CIO), 10 LA 244 (1948).
16. Arbitrators are often faced with a difficult decision; the factors
may indicate that falsification may not be the only reason for discharge
and at the same time the employer might never have hired the employee
had he told the truth. The cases cited infra, unfortunately, seem to be
rather clear cut examples at either end of the two extremes.
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company was able to show minor discrepancies in the applica-
tion was insufficient, and the employee was reinstatedY.1 The
arbitrator made a detailed inspection and analysis of the evi-
dence, and reached the conclusion that it was apparent that the
falsification charge was a mere sham. The decision was heavily
buttressed by the admitted skill of the employee and his ex-
cellent past record. Where an employee failed to give the name
of his most recent employer and this was later discovered, the
employee was held to have been discharged for just cause.?' 8
The test used by the arbitrator was that this was a part of the
application which, if answered correctly, might well have re-
sulted in a failure to hire.1-
Further mitigating factors, some of which have been dis-
cussed under Dishonesty Within the Scope of Employment, play
a part in cases of this type also. A paucity of arbitrated cases
on this subject makes further deductions in this field unprofit-
able.
IV. DISLOYALTY
The infrequency with which disloyalty cases arise makes for
a difficulty of analysis, and discussion will be confined to the
factors concerned in two cases in which employees were charged
with at least some variation of disloyalty.
A controversy arbitrated some three years ago serves to out-
line in clear perspective the manner in which the interests of
employer and employee can clash, although both are acting in
good faith. An employee of good standing was engaged in oper-
ating a lathe in a gear-manufacturing plant, where it was ad-
mitted he "had the run of the shop." Two sons of the employee
went into business in direct competition with the employer and
the employee was fired, the company stating that confidential
information inadvertently might be disclosed to the advantage
of the competitors. The arbitrator upheld the discharge,20 draw-
17. In re Aviation Maintenance Corporation and International Associa-
tion of Machinists, Aeronautical Industrial District Lodge 727, 8 LA 261(1947).
18. Having found the company innocent of anti-union activity, the
arbitrator does his bit for industrial relations by pleading that "the parties
will not permit this unpleasant incident to interfere in any way with their
exceptionally good relations." Id. at 272.
19. In re Borg-Warner Corp., Ingersoll Steel Division and United Farm
Equipment and Metal Workers of America, Local 139 (CIO), 12 LA 207(1949).
20. In re E. B. Sewall Mfg. Company and United Steel Workers of
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ing an analogy to the granting of injunctive relief against the
violation of trade secrets in chancery courts. After noting the
hardship to the employee involved in the decision, he referred
to
the much more costly hardship imposed upon the company
if they were required by a ruling in this arbitration to con-
tinue the employment of a man having access to their tech-
nical information and trade secrets in circumstances indi-
cating their probable leakage from time to time .... 21
The careful balancing of the equities involved and the socially
desirable result obtained point up the careful attention which
arbitrators must pay to conflicting interests.22
In another case which involved the employment, during off-
hours, of a ship-repair worker by a competitor of his principal
employer, the arbitrator refused to permit the discharge. It was
found as a fact that the employee sought employment for finan-
cial reasons only, and that no thought of disloyalty was involved.
The award was a suspension of the employee for two months.
The arbitrator noted in passing that the employee had performed
his job efficiently, and that the company could hardly expect the
same degree of loyalty from this employee as it received from
executives.23
The lone conclusion yielded by the paucity of cases on dis-
loyalty is that before disloyalty can be grounds for discharge,
there must be actual harm resulting to the company or a very
great likelihood thereof.
CHARLES C. ALLEN III.
America, Local 3346 (CIO), 3 LA 113 (1946). The arbitrator was Clarence
Updegraff.
21. Id. at 115.
22. As a safeguard for the interests of the discharged employee, the
arbitrator, in his award, provided that if the sons should sever their con-
nection with the competing firm within one year, the employee should be
reinstated with no loss of seniority.
23. In re Merrill-Stevens Dry Dock & Repair Company and Industrial
Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America, Local 32 (CIO),
6 LA 838 (1947).
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